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9(B) OR NOT 9(B)?  THAT IS THE QUESTION:  
HOW TO PLEAD NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION IN 
THE POST-TWOMBLY ERA 
Andrew Todres* 
 
Perhaps nothing is more important to a litigant bringing an action in 
federal court than knowing the relevant pleading standard for his or her 
underlying claims.  Ever since the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, one of two pleading standards have applied to common law 
claims:  the Rule 8(a)(2) standard, requiring a short and plain statement 
demonstrating entitlement to relief, or the Rule 9(b) standard, demanding 
that allegations of fraud or mistake be pled with particularity.  At the 
intersection of these two pleading standards is the common law claim of 
negligent misrepresentation.  Courts across the country have long 
disagreed over which standard should apply to negligent misrepresentation 
claims, with divisions present across and within circuits and districts. 
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court further complicated this issue in the 
seminal opinion Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, which effectively imposed 
a heightened “plausibility” requirement for claims governed by Rule 
8(a)(2).  This change has since led some lower courts, but not all, to 
reconsider which pleading standard to apply to claims of negligent 
misrepresentation. 
This Note:  (1) explores the pleading standards and their evolution with 
respect to negligent misrepresentation claims; (2) describes the circuit split 
and intracircuit fractures that have emerged from the different standards; 
(3) analyzes the significant procedural and substantive problems the 
competing standards have created, especially in light of Twombly; and 
(4) offers a possible resolution comporting with the Twombly holding to 
standardize the pleading of negligent misrepresentation claims across the 
nation’s federal courts. 
  
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2009, University of 
Pennsylvania.  I am forever grateful to Professor Marc Arkin, whose invaluable guidance 
and steadfast commitment to this project made the daunting process of writing a Note on a 
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 29, 2012, Terrence Hood’s life took a dramatic turn for the 
worse.1  Hood was flung from his motorcycle during an accident and rushed 
to Denver Health Medical Center, which he would call home for the next 
three months.2  Having sustained life-threatening injuries, Hood underwent 
numerous surgeries and procedures until his discharge in June.3  The cost of 
his treatment totaled approximately $750,000.4 
Hood reasonably believed that the cost would be covered under his health 
plan.  His domestic partner, Junnapa Intarakamhang, was a full-time, active 
employee of defendant Beverage Distributors Co. (Beverage Distributors), 
and a member of its employee health plan.5  She and Hood had submitted 
an application for domestic partner coverage for Hood under the plan nearly 
a year before the accident.6  Accordingly, during the first two months of 
Hood’s hospital stay, the claims administrator, defendant Principal Life 
Insurance Co. (Principal), repeatedly preauthorized additional days for 
Hood to stay at the hospital.7  These authorizations prompted the hospital to 
continue to care for Hood without interruption, and they assured the 
hospital that it did not need to seek alternate funding from a third party.8  
As far as the hospital, Hood, and Intarakamhang were concerned, Hood was 
adequately covered by insurance. 
Beverage Distributors had other ideas.  On May 14, 2009, nearly two 
months into Hood’s treatments, the company informed Intarakamhang that 
coverage for Hood under the health plan had been rescinded because he had 
been married to another woman when he enrolled in the plan as her 
domestic partner.9  This allegation left plaintiff Denver Health and Hospital 
Authority, to which the claims had been assigned, with responsibility for 
the medical bills, having never sought alternative payment arrangements 
through Medicare or a third party because of Principal’s representations.10 
Denver Health and Hospital Authority sued Beverage Distributors and 
Principal in Colorado federal court, claiming, inter alia, negligent 
misrepresentation based on their failure to use reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining and communicating information concerning 
Hood’s eligibility for benefits under the plan.11  Beverage Distributors and 
Principal moved to dismiss, claiming that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b) applied to the negligent misrepresentation claim, a heightened standard 
 
 1. See generally Denver Health & Hosp. Auth. v. Beverage Distribs. Co., 843 F. Supp. 
2d 1171 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 2. Id. at 1174–75. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1175. 
 5. Id. at 1174. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 1175. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. at 1175–78 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)). 
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that the plaintiff failed to meet.12  They contended that Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a) did not govern the negligent misrepresentation claim.13 
In response, the court held that Rule 8(a) applied, noting that “the crux of 
the claim [was] that Beverage [Distributors] failed to use reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining and communicating information concerning 
Hood’s eligibility.  This rings not of fraud but negligence.”14 
So, which pleading standard should apply in cases of negligent 
misrepresentation?  Although courts cannot agree on a resolution, one thing 
is quite apparent:  in this case and in others, the answer can be a matter of 
life or death for a civil claim. 
First, this Note explores both standards and their evolution with respect 
to negligent misrepresentation claims, and the circuit split and intracircuit 
fractures that have resulted from the differing standards.  Next, it identifies 
significant procedural and substantive problems that arise from the murky 
standards and varying requirements, especially in light of the recent seminal 
U.S. Supreme Court pleading standard cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly15 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.16  Finally, this Note offers a possible 
resolution comporting with those cases to standardize the pleading of 
negligent misrepresentation claims. 
I.  THE DIFFICULTY WITH PLEADING NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION:  AN 
OVERVIEW OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS 
Part I of this Note details negligent misrepresentation claims generally 
and discusses the corresponding federal pleading standards.  Part I.A 
introduces the tort of negligent misrepresentation, describing its origins and 
elements, showing how it is distinct from, but often confused with, fraud, 
exploring state law variations in the tort, and tracking differing policy 
approaches to applying negligent misrepresentation law.17  Part I.B then 
turns to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, providing a brief primer on 
the Rules and the reasons for their creation, and analyzing the evolution of 
Rule 8, the general pleading standard.18  Part I.C takes a look at Rule 9, the 
pleading standard requiring particularity, and traces its development 
alongside Rule 8.19  Part I.D then examines two recent, leading U.S. 
Supreme Court cases that effectively heightened the bar for pleading under 
Rule 8 and the various policy issues and difficulties that courts have faced 
in light of the current, enhanced pleading standard.20 
 
 12. Id. at 1177. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 16. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. See infra Part I.B. 
 19. See infra Part I.C. 
 20. See infra Part I.D. 
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A.  The Claim of Negligent Misrepresentation 
Negligent misrepresentation is a common tort claim, yet, in federal court, 
the law behind it is applied inconsistently, confused with fraud, and 
overlooked by courts and practitioners alike.21  This section explains the 
complexities of the claim and provide a foundation for the problems that 
arise in pleading it in the federal courts.  Part I.A.1 gives a broad overview 
of the claim and describes the general elements of it.22  Part I.A.2 traces 
some of the early scholarship regarding negligent misrepresentation 
claims.23  Part I.A.3 more thoroughly introduces some courts’ and 
practitioners’ confusion over negligent misrepresentation claims, especially 
given their similarity to fraudulent misrepresentation claims.24  Part I.A.4 
examines different policy views on the claim of negligent misrepresentation 
and how those differences lead certain states to apply the law differently.25  
Finally, Part I.A.5 explores more technical, law-based reasons driving the 
state law variations in negligent misrepresentation claims.26 
1.  What Is Negligent Misrepresentation? 
The law of negligent misrepresentation has, to a large degree, evolved 
with the law of negligence.27  The first Restatement of Torts tended to focus 
on negligent misrepresentation in the context of physical bodily harm.28  It 
did contain one single section, section 552, regarding the negligent 
communication of information causing an economic loss, entitled 
“Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others,”29 which 
created liability for those negligently supplying information in the course of 
business. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted a slightly different version of 
section 552, essentially allowing for a broader class of potential plaintiffs 
by adding language that supported liability for a party who supplies 
information not only in the course of business, but also “in any other 
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest.”30  This “pecuniary 
interest” addition was significant because it clarified that the information 
negligently supplied need not be in connection with the party’s own 
business or profession.31 
 
 21. See generally Robert K. Wise & Heather E. Poole, Negligent Misrepresentation in 
Texas:  The Misunderstood Tort, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 845, 846 (2008). 
 22. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 23. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 24. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 25. See infra Part I.A.4. 
 26. See infra Part I.A.5. 
 27. See generally Seth E. Lipner & Lisa A. Catalano, The Tort of Giving Negligent 
Investment Advice, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 663, 669–70 (2009). 
 28. See id. at 677–78.  This focus reflected an emphasis on the then-burgeoning 
development of products liability law and negligence. See id. at 670. 
 29. Id. at 677–78. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
 31. See Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 682. 
1452 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
It is also worth noting that the official comment to section 552 in the 
Restatement (Second) stressed that the law “applies not only to information 
given as to the existence of facts but also to an opinion given upon facts 
equally well known to both the supplier and the recipient.”32  Thus, it is 
possible that even a negligently given opinion can form the basis of a cause 
of action.33 
The duty under the Restatement to “exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the information”34 is not 
necessarily fixed and can change depending on the circumstances.35  The 
factors that courts consider range from the character of the informant to the 
sophistication of the person receiving the supplied information.36  It is 
possible for a party to be liable for negligent misrepresentation even when 
the person making the statement is not aware that it is untrue.37  The 
hallmark of negligent misrepresentation is precisely that it does not require 
an intent to defraud, or scienter.38 
In addition to sophistication, the experience of the person receiving 
information can also affect the liability of the informant in the context of 
reliance:  where the potential plaintiff has significant experience in the area 
in which he is relying on the potential defendant, his chance of succeeding 
on a negligent misrepresentation claim might be diminished.39 
Finally, in certain circumstances, as the Restatement (Second) highlights, 
a party can be liable for negligent misrepresentation if he has a duty to 
disclose information, and fails to do so.40  However, given the reliance 
element, an omission alone is not actionable—the plaintiff must have 
justifiably relied on the omission underlying the misrepresentation claim.41 
The overwhelming majority of state courts have adopted, in one form or 
another, the approach in section 552 of the Restatement (Second).42 
2.  Early Scholarship Regarding Negligent Misrepresentation 
and Development Thereof 
Given the contours of the claim, determining liability for negligent 
misrepresentation invariably requires fact-intensive inquiries made on a 
case-by-case basis.  Such inquiries must uncover the extent and justifiability 
of a potential plaintiff’s reliance on those representations, as well the 
 
 32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. b. 
 33. Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 690–91. 
 34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552. 
 35. See Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 692–93. 
 36. See id. at 693. 
 37. See, e.g., Galloway v. Afco Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
 38. See id. (collecting cases). 
 39. See Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 695. 
 40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see also Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 
562, 573 n.12 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). 
 41. See Ross v. Kirner, 172 P.3d 701, 704 (Wash. 2007) (“An omission alone cannot 
constitute negligent misrepresentation, since the plaintiff must justifiably rely on a 
misrepresentation.”). 
 42. See Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 680. 
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appropriateness of a potential defendant’s and potential plaintiff’s due 
diligence under the circumstances.43  Courts have traditionally approached 
claims for negligent misrepresentation with caution.44 
At the heart of these inquiries are the reasonable expectations, or lack 
thereof, of the potential plaintiff acting on the guidance received.45  As 
Fowler V. Harper and Mary Coate McNeely astutely noted in an article 
observing early trends and policy concerns surrounding negligent 
misrepresentation claims, “[t]he propriety of the plaintiff’s expectation 
involves the business ethics and mores and those general canons of fairness 
and decency which affect that standard of judgment which, for want of a 
better name, we call common sense.”46  Scholars and courts from the outset 
also grappled with the fine-tuned distinction between honesty and deceit in 
the context of negligent misrepresentation claims.47 
Historically, in order to be liable for a misrepresentation tort, some sort 
of scienter or blatant dishonesty was required.48  In a leading English case, 
Palsey v. Freeman,49 the court wrote that the defendant misrepresentor 
would not be liable for damages unless it could be proven that he was a 
liar.50 
But over time, U.S. courts, still using English law as a guide, started 
departing from traditional notions of dishonesty as a necessary condition for 
actionable misrepresentation claims.51  American courts began to recognize 
words as “acts,” as opposed to “mere words,”52 which can form the basis 
for actionable wrongs, even when not obviously malintentioned.53  In 
essence, people could now be held accountable for carelessly spoken words 
that injure others in the same way that they could be held accountable for 
carelessly dropping a sack of flour onto someone and injuring him.  For 
instance, the famous opinion of Justice Benjamin Cardozo in Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche54 concluded that defendants could not escape liability for 
 
 43. See generally Fowler V. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of 
Misrepresentation, 22 MINN. L. REV. 939 (1938). 
 44. See id. at 941 (“Legal liability is normally imposed only when the interests of one 
party are so invaded that good social engineering requires governmental protection.”). 
 45. See id. at 941–42. 
 46. See id. at 942. 
 47. See W. Page Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation:  Legal Fault As a Requirement 
I.  Some General Observations, 1 OKLA. L. REV. 21, 23–25 (1948); see also Harper & 
McNeely, supra note 43, at 959. 
 48. See Keeton, supra note 47, at 24. 
 49. (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B.). 
 50. See Keeton, supra note 47, at 24. 
 51. See id. at 25–27. 
 52. Jeremiah Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARV. L. REV. 184, 189–90 
(1901). 
 53. See id. at 190.  In this chestnut of an article, Jeremiah Smith proved to be at the 
forefront of the law of negligence before the topic had started to garner the widespread 
attention of the courts that it would ultimately receive.  “It is undeniable that the making of 
erroneous statements without reasonable grounds is liable under some circumstances to 
cause damage. . . .  Why not then impose in certain cases a duty to use reasonable care to 
refrain from making erroneous statements?” Id. 
 54. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
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misrepresentation merely because they believed their statements to be 
true.55 
The impetus for this shift in the law seems related to the question of 
justifiable reliance and parties’ expectations.  As case law developed at the 
turn of the twentieth century, courts established a general presumption that 
parties to a transaction may normally expect honesty from each other.56  As 
such, the cause of action of negligent misrepresentation allowed plaintiffs to 
hold accountable defendants who, despite honest behavior, were still 
negligent in communicating material information.57 
Further, when likening negligent misrepresentation to legal principles of 
warranty and estoppel, courts and scholars started to recognize that the old 
English rule was illogical.58  In considering the entire body of 
misrepresentation law as it developed in American courts, a rule 
exonerating defendants who made an honest but false statement that 
induced a plaintiff to act to his detriment simply did not make sense in light 
of the principle of warranty law, which established legal liability for honest 
and morally innocent acts causing injury or damage.59  Further, such a rule 
would be unjust to potential plaintiffs.60 
3.  Negligent Misrepresentation Versus Fraudulent Misrepresentation:  
Examining the Similarities and Differences and the Inconsistent 
Treatment by Courts 
As misrepresentation law developed alongside negligence law, courts 
were faced with a lingering issue:  how should negligent misrepresentation 
be treated in comparison to fraudulent misrepresentation?61 
As a purely legal matter, there must be some difference between 
negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation; otherwise, 
the former cause of action would not exist.  To this end, the official 
comment to section 552 of the Restatement draws a distinction between 
negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation by placing the latter more 
squarely in the category of deceit.62 
 
 55. See Keeton, supra note 47, at 26. 
 56. Harper & McNeely, supra note 43, at 959. 
 57. See Keeton, supra note 47, at 29. 
 58. See Samuel Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REV. 
415, 434 (1911). 
 59. See id. at 435. 
 60. See id. (“However honest his state of mind, he has induced another to act, and 
damage has been thereby caused.  If it be added that the plaintiff had just reason to attribute 
to the defendant accurate knowledge of what he was talking about, and the statement related 
to a matter of business in regard to which action was to be expected, every moral reason 
exists for holding the defendant liable.”). 
 61. This question is especially significant because it would come to inform the debate 
over which federal pleading standard should apply to negligent misrepresentation claims.  
For more discussion on this issue, see infra Part II. 
 62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977) (“The liability stated in this 
Section is likewise more restricted than that for fraudulent misrepresentation stated in § 531.  
When there is no intent to deceive but only good faith coupled with negligence, the fault of 
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Even the early foundations of American misrepresentation law have 
recognized this important difference.63  As Jeremiah Smith noted, 
“‘Negligence is not the same as fraud.’  An action of deceit based on fraud 
cannot be supported by proof of negligent misrepresentation.”64  In 
addition, conflating the causes of action raises the potential problem of 
overlooking or disregarding the intentional or unintentional nature of a 
given misrepresentation.65 
To address this issue, courts frequently distinguish fraudulent 
misrepresentation by requiring scienter—that is, that a defendant have 
actual knowledge or a belief that his representation is not true.66  Put 
differently, negligent misrepresentation can be classified as “fraud minus 
the purpose.”67  The Restatement elements of fraudulent misrepresentation 
are thus essentially the same as negligent misrepresentation, save for the 
scienter difference: 
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker  
 (a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be,  
 (b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation 
that he states or implies, or  
 (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he 
states or implies.68 
Still, for a representation “to be fraudulent it is not necessary that the 
maker know the matter is not as represented. . . .  It is enough that being 
conscious that he has neither knowledge nor belief in the existence of the 
matter he chooses to assert it as a fact.”69 
Despite what appears to be a fairly simple and workable distinction 
between the two claims, courts have nonetheless confused them over and 
over again.70  In fact, even leading national treatises on tort law pay little 
heed to the difference between negligent and fraudulent 
misrepresentation.71  Some legal commentators have struggled with the fact 
that negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation both 
 
the maker of the misrepresentation is sufficiently less to justify a narrower responsibility for 
its consequences.”). 
 63. See Smith, supra note 52, at 185. 
 64. See id. at 185. 
 65. See Francis H. Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated As 
Negligence or Fraud?, 18 VA. L. REV. 703, 706 (1932) (“If negligent misrepresentation is 
called fraud, and, therefore, comes to be regarded by courts as tantamount thereto, there is 
danger that the unintentional character of the one and the intentional character of the other 
will be overlooked.”). 
 66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526. 
 67. Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 664 (citing Reno v. Bull, 124 N.E. 144, 145 
(N.Y. 1919)). 
 68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526. 
 69. Id. § 526 cmt. e. 
 70. See, e.g., Wise & Poole, supra note 21, at 847 (“Unfortunately, the commentary on 
negligent misrepresentation under Texas law is cursory, lumping negligent misrepresentation 
with the discussions of fraud.”). 
 71. See id. at 846 n.2. 
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require an evaluation of the misrepresentor’s state of mind, as he is “the 
only one normally who can explain how he could have honestly made such 
a mistake.”72  Thus, it is often difficult to differentiate the proof needed for 
each respective claim.73 
As such, courts have developed different notions of what kinds of actions 
or misstatements should give rise to fraudulent misrepresentation, as 
opposed to negligent misrepresentation.  Some cases are easy to 
categorize—when the defendant makes a statement he believes to be false, 
then a finding of fraudulent misrepresentation is obvious.74  But there is a 
gray area where the defendant makes a statement in “conscious ignorance” 
of the truth, but not necessarily with knowledge that his words are untrue, 
especially given the difficulty in determining the requisite state of mind in a 
given case.75  Thus, some courts follow the rule that “an unqualified 
assertion of a fact susceptible of defendant’s knowledge is regarded as an 
assertion of that knowledge, and if the defendant does not have it the 
statement is fraudulent.”76  Naturally, these shades of gray also impugn the 
very nature of the respective torts, blurring the line between negligence and 
more malevolent intentions. 
4.  Differing State Policy Approaches to 
Negligent Misrepresentation Claims 
To that end, states have developed various policy stances on how 
negligent misrepresentation claims ought to be treated and classified, 
forming the basis for state-to-state differences in negligent 
misrepresentation law.77  The main question driving the state policy 
differences flows from the early intellectual and legal underpinnings of 
misrepresentation law and negligence law78—is a claim for negligent 
misrepresentation tantamount to an action of deceit, or is it so starkly 
different from an intentional wrong that it must be treated more as an action 
of negligence?79 
In Falls Sand & Gravel Co. v. Western Concrete, Inc.,80 the District of 
Montana addressed this question extensively in a particularly instructive 
 
 72. Page Keeton, Fraud:  The Necessity for an Intent To Deceive, 5 UCLA L. REV. 583, 
596 (1958). 
 73. Id. at 583–84. 
 74. See, e.g., Shackett v. Bickford, 65 A. 252, 252–54 (N.H. 1906) (holding that the 
fraudulent character of a representation is established when the person making the 
representation does not believe it to be true); Howard v. Gould, 28 Vt. 523 (1856) (same). 
 75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 reporter’s note (1977). 
 76. See id. 
 77. This subsection of the Note will address the policy issues driving the debate among 
states over the proper classification of negligent misrepresentation claims.  For a more 
detailed examination of state law variations in negligent misrepresentation law that have 
developed in part as a result of these interpretative issues, see infra Part I.A.5. 
 78. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 79. See, e.g., Falls Sand & Gravel Co. v. W. Concrete, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 495, 501–02 
(D. Mont. 1967). 
 80. Id. 
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opinion arising out of a dispute between a sand supplier and concrete 
contractor.81  In this case, the plaintiff contracted with the defendant to 
supply sand for a building project, and the defendant provided the plaintiff 
with production schedules and amounts of sand required at various intervals 
throughout that schedule.82  As it turned out, the defendant negligently 
misrepresented the schedule to the plaintiff, and the resulting deviations led 
to sporadic operations and increased the attendant costs to the plaintiff by 
over $100,000.83 
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for several counts of 
negligent misrepresentation, but interestingly, the defendant argued as one 
of its defenses that the two-year statute of limitations for a claim for fraud 
had expired.84  The court then conducted an inquiry into whether an action 
for negligent misrepresentation should essentially be deemed an action for 
fraud, ultimately holding that it should, meaning that a two-year statute of 
limitations would apply.85 
In reaching this conclusion, the court framed its opinion by 
acknowledging that negligent misrepresentation “is quite different from an 
action for intentional fraudulent and deceitful misrepresentation, since there 
is no requirement of scienter.”86  However, the court noted that “as the law 
of this tort developed, the courts of the United States have frequently 
extended the action of deceit into that of negligent misrepresentation” by 
presuming the existence of an intent to deceive.87 
Ultimately, the opinion reflected a belief held by several states that there 
can be different grades of severity of negligent misrepresentation.  The 
court emphasized that even Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Ultramares88 
provided recovery for the plaintiff primarily on grounds of deceit, not strict 
negligence, because the negligence was “so great that it amounted to 
scienter.”89  This conception of negligent misrepresentation as a subset of 
fraud remains alive and well in some states today.90 
Conversely, many states and legal commentators refuse to extend fraud 
and actions for deceit to cover negligent misrepresentation claims.91  Even 
the opinion in Falls Sand acknowledged that the Restatement, Prosser and 
 
 81. Id. at 498. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 501–02. 
 85. Id. at 501–05. 
 86. Id. at 501. 
 87. Id. at 502. 
 88. For a related discussion, see supra Part I.A.2. 
 89. Falls Sand, 270 F. Supp. at 502. 
 90. See Oakland Raiders v. Oakland-Alameda Cnty. Coliseum, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144, 149 
(Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the word “fraud” can be used to describe certain negligent 
misrepresentations); Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540, 553 (Md. 1996); 
Bourgois v. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 466 N.W.2d 813, 818 (N.D. 1991). 
 91. See, e.g., Bhandari v. VHA Sw. Cmty. Health Corp., No. CIV 09-0932 JB/GBW, 
2011 WL 1336512, at *15–17 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2011) (collecting cases distinguishing 
negligent misrepresentation from fraud and deceit); see also Tex. Tunneling Co. v. City of 
Chattanooga, 329 F.2d 402, 410 (6th Cir. 1964); Falls Sand, 270 F. Supp. at 502. 
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Keeton on Torts, and a wide band of case law support the opposite position 
from the one that the Falls Sand court adopted.92  Thus, courts have 
differing views about the character of negligent misrepresentation, 
influencing their legal treatment of negligent misrepresentation claims. 
5.  State Law Variations in Negligent Misrepresentation 
These differing concepts of negligent misrepresentation can affect what a 
plaintiff is required to show when pleading negligent misrepresentation in a 
given state.  For example, an examination of the law in Florida is instructive 
because the elements of negligent misrepresentation track a fraud- and 
deceit-based conception of the tort: 
In Florida, plaintiffs may establish negligent misrepresentation by proving 
“(1) [a] misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) the representor . . . 
ma[d]e the representation without knowledge as to its truth or falsity, or 
. . . under circumstances in which he ought to have known of its falsity; 
(3) the representor . . . intend[ed] that the misrepresentation induce 
another to act on it; (4) injury must result to the party acting in justifiable 
reliance on the misrepresentation.”93 
Florida’s highest court has long held that these elements make negligent 
misrepresentation “tantamount to actionable fraud,”94 noting that because it 
is an action “for deceit, [it] is necessarily founded in fraud, and, in order to 
make out a case of fraud, as distinguished from inadvertence, mistake, 
negligence, accident, and the like, it is necessary to allege and prove the 
scienter,—the knowledge of defendant that his representations were 
false.”95 
Other courts have resisted this approach.96  New Mexico, for instance, 
draws careful distinctions in its law between negligent misrepresentation 
and fraud, noting, inter alia, that “fraudulent misrepresentation requires an 
untrue statement, while negligent misrepresentation may involve a 
statement that is ‘literally true’ but misleading.”97 
Thus, elements of negligent misrepresentation and accompanying 
standards of proof can vary across states, placing differing burdens on 
plaintiffs when bringing negligent misrepresentation claims in court. 
 
 92. Falls Sand, 270 F. Supp. at 502 (identifying the conflict of authorities regarding the 
relation of deceit to negligent misrepresentation claims). 
 93. Souran v. Travelers Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1993) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Hoon v. Pate Constr. Co., 607 So. 2d 423, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) 
(per curiam)). 
 94. Ostreyko v. B. C. Morton Org., Inc., 310 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
 95. Watson v. Jones, 25 So. 678, 681–82 (Fla. 1899). 
 96. See, e.g., Goehring v. Chapman Univ., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 47 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The 
tort of negligent misrepresentation does not require scienter . . . .”). 
 97. Eckhardt v. Charter Hosp. of Albuquerque, Inc., 953 P.2d 722, 735 (N.M. 1997). 
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B.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Notice Pleading 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are a set of rules applying to all 
civil actions and proceedings in the U.S. district courts.98  Rule 8 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describes the pleading requirements for 
most claims in federal courts.99 
One of the main goals of establishing the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was to create a system of rules that was simpler and more litigant 
friendly, in contrast to the formalism of the previous pleading rules, which 
were especially regimented and formal and frequently prevented litigants 
from having their day in court.100  This was the vision of Charles E. Clark, 
dean of Yale Law School and later a Second Circuit judge, who served as 
the reporter for the original Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules and 
is considered to be their chief architect.101 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was designed to promote 
the type of simplicity and increased accessibility to courts that Clark sought 
to achieve.102  The rules of pleading in the context of Rule 8, according to 
Clark, were “not the place to obtain particularization of the case.”103  To 
that end, Rule 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”104 
The legal sufficiency of a complaint may be challenged by a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted.105  In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court must accept the 
plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe the complaint liberally granting 
the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the 
facts.”106 
Clark thought that an important purpose of Rule 8 was to ensure that a 
complaint would provide sufficient facts to guide a potential res judicata 
determination, so as to know whether a final judgment had already been 
rendered on a given matter.107  In essence, Clark believed that complaints 
 
 98. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 99. See id. R. 8. 
 100. See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV. 272, 274 (1942) (“Strict 
pleading produces a reaction, because people will not tolerate the denial of justice for 
formalities only.  That is the history we must always bear in mind as to common-law 
pleading, as well as under some of the later misapplications of code pleading.”); see also 
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990–91 (2003) 
(“[T]he Federal Rules are essentially a reform effort designed to ensure litigants have their 
day in court.”). 
 101. Peter Julian, Comment, Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading:  Against a 
“Formalism of Generality,” 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1180 (2010). 
 102. See id. at 1196. 
 103. Clark, supra note 100, at 287.  While Rule 8 applies to most claims brought in 
federal court, the pleading of “fraud or mistake” and “conditions of mind” are governed by a 
heightened standard under Rule 9(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  For a detailed discussion of 
Rule 9(b), see infra Part I.C. 
 104. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 105. See id. R. 12(b)(6). 
 106. Fairman, supra note 100, at 992. 
 107. Julian, supra note 101, at 1196. 
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should give adequate notice to the court and the defendant of a plaintiff’s 
claims by means of “very brief and direct allegation[s].”108  He did not 
believe that pleadings were the proper place to provide evidence or proof—
a departure from past practice.109 
This pleading regime became more complex after the Supreme Court’s 
holding in the 1957 case Conley v. Gibson.110  In Conley, the plaintiffs, who 
were African American railway workers, alleged that their union provided 
them with inferior representation as compared to similarly situated white 
workers.111  In response, the union defendants argued, inter alia, that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted because it contained insufficient factual allegations to support their 
general claims of discrimination.112 
In evaluating that argument, the Supreme Court posited that sufficiency 
of allegations contained in a complaint would follow “the accepted rule that 
a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”113  The Supreme Court 
justified this approach by pointing to Rule 8 and stressing that the 
complaint need only contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that 
will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.”114  Accordingly, the Court found that the 
plaintiffs survived the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because their complaint 
gave the defendants fair notice of the basis of their claim.115 
The Conley holding set the trajectory for pleading in federal courts for 
years to come, with its “no set of facts” language characterizing the modern 
understanding of what came to be known as “notice pleading.”116  The very 
term “notice pleading” had been rejected by Clark and the original drafters 
of the Federal Rules, coming into style only after it was used by the 
Supreme Court in Conley.117 
This style of pleading, as set forth in Conley, failed to advance a number 
of important values courts sought to protect.118  Courts generally use 
procedure to promote adjudicative efficiency, fairness, and predictability, 
 
 108. Id. at 1197 (citing Charles E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New 
Federal Rules I, 15 TENN. L. REV. 551, 568 (1939)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 111. Id. at 43. 
 112. See id. at 43, 46–47. 
 113. Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. at 47 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 115. Id. at 48. 
 116. See Julian, supra note 101, at 1189 (“Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language was 
fundamental to the modern understanding of notice pleading, at least as it was expressed in 
the rhetoric of the courts.”). 
 117. See id. at 1189.  Courts had used the term very infrequently prior to Conley. Id. at 
1190.  After the Conley decision, courts’ use of the term increased exponentially. Id.  For a 
statistical evaluation of this increase, see Fairman, supra note 100, at 988 n.4. 
 118. See Julian, supra note 101, at 1182, 1191. 
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among other values.119  By allowing such a generalized, liberal form of 
pleading, courts found themselves with clogged dockets, and plaintiffs 
found a lower initial barrier to entry than before.120  And many lower courts 
that disagreed with the “notice pleading” mandate simply eschewed it for 
their own, ad hoc heightened standards, especially in cases alleging a 
defendant’s improper state of mind, making litigation highly 
unpredictable.121 
With lower courts subverting the Conley ruling, the Supreme Court 
revisited pleading standards in 1993 in Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit.122  In this case, the district 
court had imposed a heightened pleading standard for a civil rights claim—
exactly the type of claim that is generally easy to plead and potentially very 
harmful to a defendant’s reputation, triggering policy concerns among 
lower courts.123  The Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s approach, 
holding that because civil rights claims were not expressly included in the 
category of claims eligible for heightened pleading standards under Federal 
Rule 9(b), Rule 8 applied.124 
Even after Leatherman, though, lower courts persisted in applying 
heightened pleading standards.125  This led the Supreme Court to address 
the issue again in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,126 attempting to restore 
order to the district courts and bring them in line with Conley notice 
pleading.127  In this employment discrimination action, the Court reinforced 
its holding in Leatherman.128 
Nonetheless, the pattern of ignoring notice pleading at the district court 
level continued, with courts becoming increasingly concerned about 
protecting defendants’ reputations, trimming ever-expanding dockets, and 
addressing increasingly expensive discovery costs as a result of electronic 
discovery.129 
As evidenced by Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, certain types of claims—
especially easy-to-plead claims with significant reputational implications 
like fraud and civil rights violations—required greater factual specificity in 
order to preserve these fairness- and efficiency-based values.130  This 
practice threatened the transsubstantive nature of Rule 8.131  As different 
 
 119. See id. at 1182. 
 120. See id. at 1192. 
 121. See id. at 1191 (“[L]ower courts [paid] lip service to the rhetoric of notice pleading 
while actually imposing heightened pleading standards.”). 
 122. 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 123. See id. at 165. 
 124. Id. at 168. 
 125. See Julian, supra note 101, at 1190. 
 126. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 127. See id. at 514. 
 128. Id. at 512–13. 
 129. See Julian, supra note 101, at 1192–93, 1210. 
 130. See id. at 1192–93. 
 131. See Fairman, supra note 100, at 1037–38.  Transsubstantivity is essentially “the 
notion that the same procedural rules should be available for all civil law suits:  
(1) regardless of the substantive law underlying the claims, or “case-type” transsubstantivity; 
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styles of pleading continued to pervade the district courts, it became 
appropriate to question not only the force of Rule 8, but even the place of 
Rule 9(b) as well. 
C.  Rule 9(b):  The Heightened Federal Pleading Standard 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead claims of 
fraud or mistake with particularity.132  As courts typically look to the 
“circumstances constituting fraud,”133 factors such as “time, place, contents 
of the false representation, the person making it, and what was obtained 
from it must be stated with specificity.”134  This is a sensible formulation 
for affirmative misrepresentations because they “are discrete, observable 
events which can be particularized.”135  Just because a claim is not 
technically referred to as “fraud” does not mean it is automatically exempt 
from the heightened standard.136 
Interestingly, Clark never thought that Rule 9(b) was very significant; he 
assumed that courts had the discretion to adjust pleading standards as they 
saw fit on a case-by-case basis.137  In the congressional hearings on the 
Federal Rules at the time of their inception—and in related American Bar 
Association proceedings—Rule 9(b) was barely discussed.138 
Rule 9(b) was initially drawn from Rule 22 of the English Practice Rules, 
which allowed for knowledge to be alleged in general terms, without an 
explanation of the surrounding circumstances.139  However, while the plain 
language of Rule 9(b) and its origins do not seem entirely stringent, courts 
have, over time, applied an even more heightened version of the standard, 
with the Second Circuit requiring plaintiffs to plead facts giving rise to a 
“strong inference of scienter.”140  Other circuits have recognized that 
plaintiffs may generally allege scienter merely by stating its existence.141 
 
and (2) regardless of the size of the litigation or the stakes involved, or case-size 
transsubstantivity.” Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure:  An 
Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 378 
(2010). 
 132. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.  Malice, intent, knowledge, and 
other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Fairman, supra note 100, at 1004. 
 135. Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 195 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (“An 
affirmative misrepresentation involves a specific statement made at a specific place and time 
and involves specific persons.”). 
 136. See Fairman, supra note 100, at 1005 (“[I]f the claim is ‘fraud-like,’ specificity is 
required.”). 
 137. See Clark, supra note 100, at 274.  Clark argued that the rule was not important 
because it “probably state[d] only what courts would do anyhow and may not be considered 
absolutely essential.” Id. 
 138. William E. Richman, Donald E. Lively & Patricia Mell, The Pleading of Fraud:  
Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 965 (1987). 
 139. Daniel L. Brockett & Jeremy D. Andersen, Pleading Common Law Fraud in the 
Second Circuit, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 27, 2012, at A4. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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It is important to note that cases of securities fraud automatically adhere 
to a separate, heightened standard as a result of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995142 (PLSRA)—the standard is similar to that 
of Rule 9(b).143  Congress adopted the Second Circuit’s version of this 
standard—considered to be the most stringent—for applicable securities 
fraud claims.144  Significantly, Congress also required that the Rule 9(b) 
standard be applied to claims of misrepresentation in the same context.145 
While this Note addresses only common law claims of 
misrepresentation—not those in the securities fraud context falling under 
the PSLRA—it is important to understand how the PSLRA standard may 
have leaked into common law pleading standard jurisprudence.146  As 
courts have decided more and more cases under the PSLRA, which 
essentially adopted the toughest version of Rule 9(b)’s standard, common 
law fraud claims across circuits have been increasingly held to a similar 
standard.147 
D.  Putting Conley to Bed:  A New Pleading Regime 
Under Twombly and Iqbal 
As lower courts continued to reject Conley and its progeny when 
choosing which pleading standard to apply, the Supreme Court ultimately 
decided to abandon Conley for good.  This subsection examines a pair of 
Supreme Court cases that collectively heightened the pleading requirement 
under Rule 8 and established a new pleading standard regime. 
1.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
Not even Swierkiewicz could put an end to lower courts’ subversion of 
Conley’s notice-pleading pronouncement.148  Accordingly, just four years 
after its decision in Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court revisited the Rule 8 
pleading standard yet again in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.149  The case 
would come to signify a major shift in the Rule 8 standard, effectively 
retiring Conley-style notice pleading.150 
 
 142. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
 143. See Evan Hill, Note, The Rule 10b-5 Suit:  Loss Causation Pleading Standards in 
Private Securities Fraud Claims After Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2659, 2672 (2010). 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. at 2672–73 (citing S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694). 
 146. See Brockett & Andersen, supra note 139. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 149. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 150. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 432, 432 (2008) 
(“Although the Court’s move in this direction is consistent with long-held sentiment among 
the lower federal courts, the Twombly decision represents a break from the Court’s previous 
embrace of notice pleading.”). 
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In Twombly, customers of local internet and telephone companies 
brought a putative class action suit against these companies alleging, inter 
alia, antitrust violations.151  At bottom, plaintiffs claimed that larger local 
telephone companies conspired to restrict smaller carriers’ access to their 
local markets, which effectively drove down competition locally, and the 
companies also agreed not to compete with one another, which enabled 
them to charge artificially high prices for their services.152 
Writing for the majority, Justice David H. Souter emphasized that in 
order for the plaintiffs’ claim to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the 
plaintiffs would need to provide evidence in their complaint that 
demonstrated that the defendant telephone companies did not act 
independently.153  The Court then, citing to Conley, explained that while 
Rule 8(a)(2) only requires a short and plain statement that gives a defendant 
fair notice of the claims, a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of 
his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”154 
The Court then went on to depart from notice pleading even further, 
asserting that the facts pled must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in 
the complaint are true.”155  The Court reasoned that requiring the complaint 
to state “plausible grounds to infer an agreement [among the defendant 
telephone companies] does not impose a probability requirement at the 
pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”156 
Thus, in the context of the complaint in Twombly, the Court held that 
while the underlying allegations regarding an agreement among the 
defendant telephone companies were almost sufficient to state a claim, 
“without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitle[ment] to relief.’”157 
Furthermore, the Court disposed of the plaintiffs’ argument that a 
common reading of Conley and its “no set of facts” language precluded the 
application of this higher, plausibility-based standard.158  In essence, the 
Court claimed that the Conley language had been widely misinterpreted 
over the years and could conceivably permit a “wholly conclusory” claim to 
survive a 12(b)(6) challenge where the pleading left open the chance of 
establishing some set of facts which at a later time might establish grounds 
 
 151. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550–51. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 554. 
 154. Id. at 555. 
 155. Id. at 555 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)).  To 
this end, the court noted that Rule 8 required some “showing” of “entitlement to relief.”  Id. 
at 555 n.3. 
 156. Id. at 556 (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. at 557 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. at 560–61. 
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for recovery.159  Therefore, with respect to the “no set of facts” language, 
the Court declared that “this famous observation has earned its 
retirement.”160 
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in Twombly, 
observing that the high costs of discovery in an antitrust suit such as the one 
at bar—as well as the generally increasing costs of discovery because of 
electronic documents—implicitly drove the majority’s decision to heighten 
the pleading standard.161  Justice Stevens believed that the answer to this 
potential problem was not a plausibility standard, but “careful case 
management, including strict control of discovery, careful scrutiny of 
evidence at the summary judgment stage, and lucid instructions to 
juries.”162  In addition, Justice Stevens felt that Rule 8, as codified in the 
Federal Rules, “does not require, or even invite, the pleading of facts,” 
noting that Conley remained good law despite the majority’s interpretation 
of it.163 
The Court’s decision in Twombly left many questions unanswered and 
raised questions regarding transsubstantivity in the process—should this 
pleading standard apply only to antitrust claims and the like, or to all 
claims?  Justice Stevens reflected on this question in his Twombly dissent, 
wondering “[w]hether the Court’s actions will benefit only defendants in 
antitrust treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a 
complaint w[ould] inure to the benefit of all civil defendants.”164 
2.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
The Supreme Court answered those questions two years later when it 
revisited the Rule 8 standard once more in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.165  Iqbal 
involved an entirely different set of claims from those in Twombly—in 
Iqbal, an individual arrested on immigration charges sued former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, director of the FBI, among 
others, for violations of his First and Fifth Amendment rights because of 
mistreatment while in detention.166 
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy reaffirmed the 
Court’s holding in Twombly that Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to 
contain enough allegations such that relief would be plausible.167  However, 
the Court expanded on the holding in Twombly, specifically highlighting 
two “working principles”168 at the core of the Twombly decision:  (1) in 
 
 159. Id. at 561; see also Spencer, supra note 150, at 447 (describing the inconsistency 
between Twombly plausibility pleading and Conley’s “no set of facts” language). 
 160. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 
 161. See id. at 572–73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 162. Id. at 573. 
 163. See id. at 580. 
 164. Id. at 596. 
 165. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 166. Id. at 667–68. 
 167. See id. at 677–78. 
 168. Id. at 678. 
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deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the factual 
allegations of a complaint as true, but not conclusory allegations that track 
the relevant legal standard, and (2) only a complaint containing a plausible 
claim for relief can survive a motion to dismiss.169  Accordingly, a court 
must conduct a two-step inquiry when reviewing a complaint challenged 
under 12(b)(6), first identifying which claims do not deserve to be accepted 
as true because they are factually unsupported and are “no more than 
conclusions,”170 and then deciding whether the remaining allegations can 
plausibly support entitlement to relief.171 
In applying this analysis to Iqbal’s claims, the Court found that the 
factual allegations pled did not give rise to a plausible inference that Iqbal 
was entitled to relief, primarily because there were other “more likely” 
explanations for Iqbal’s alleged mistreatment than those that he pleaded.172 
Even more important, however, the Court clearly stated that Twombly 
reached beyond the context of antitrust cases:  “[Twombly] was based on 
our interpretation and application of Rule 8 . . . [which] governs the 
pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings . . . .’  Our decision 
in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it 
applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.”173 
The Court also pushed back on Iqbal’s argument that Rule 9(b)’s 
statement that “conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally”174 
permitted him to allege generally the discriminatory intent underlying his 
claims for relief.175  Specifically, the Court noted that “generally” is a 
“relative term,” which “in the context of Rule 9” is to be “compared to the 
particularity requirement applicable to fraud or mistake.”176 
Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, disagreeing with the notion 
that allegations in a complaint do not deserve to be automatically accepted 
as true:  “Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to 
consider whether the factual allegations are probably true.  We made it 
clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the allegations as true, no 
matter how skeptical the court may be.”177 
 
 169. See id. at 678–79; see also Anthony Gambol, Note, The Twombly Standard and 
Affirmative Defenses:  What Is Good for the Goose Is Not Always Good for the Gander, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2188 (2011). 
 170. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 680. 
 173. Id. at 684 (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 174. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (emphasis added). 
 175. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687 (“Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the bare 
elements of his cause of action, affix the label ‘general allegation,’ and expect his complaint 
to survive a motion to dismiss.”). 
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though still operative—strictures of Rule 8.”). 
 177. Id. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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3.  Reconciling Rule 9(b) with Rule 8(a)(2) After Twombly and Iqbal 
In order to understand the interplay between Rule 9(b) and Rule 8(a) in 
the context of negligent misrepresentation claims, it is necessary to examine 
the potential impact that the revised Rule 8 standard has on the operation of 
Rule 9. 
In many ways, Twombly and Iqbal have seemingly blurred the line 
between Rule 8(a)(2) and 9(b), or, at minimum, produced inconsistencies 
among the rules.  To the former point, the Twombly rule that the complaint 
must include factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level” seems similar to a particularity requirement.178  To 
the latter point, Rule 9(b)’s language about averring conditions of the mind 
“generally” refers to the traditional Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard—the 
very standard that Twombly raises.179 
While it may still be too early to discern how the rules in the post–
Twombly and Iqbal era will work in conjunction with each other in practice, 
there are reasons to believe that the distinction remains meaningful.180  
Twombly specifically distinguished the new Rule 8 standard from Rule 
9(b): 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any “heightened” pleading 
standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9, which can only be accomplished “by the process of 
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”  On 
certain subjects understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a 
plaintiff must state factual allegations with greater particularity than Rule 
8 requires.  Here, our concern is not that the allegations in the complaint 
were insufficiently “particular[ized],” rather, the complaint warranted 
dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief 
plausible.181 
Only time will tell how this distinction actually plays out in the lower 
courts, which have demonstrated—in the arena of pleading standards—a 
pattern of ignoring Supreme Court precedent.  
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 179. See id. at 474 (“Any standard that requires ‘more than labels and conclusions’ and 
explicitly calls for the pleading of suggestive facts supporting legal assertions such as the 
existence of an unlawful agreement or conspiracy fails to permit matters to be averred 
generally.”). 
 180. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal:  A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 88 n.333 (2010) (“[I]n Starr v. Sony BMG 
Music Entertainment, 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010), the court suggested that facts related to 
time, place, or the specific individuals involved are necessary to satisfy Rule 8 only if the 
other factual allegations do not provide notice.”); see also Hollander v. Etymotic Research, 
Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 543, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding allegations might meet Rule 8 
standards, but not Rule 9(b)). 
 181. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 (alteration in original) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)).  Thus, it would appear that there is an important 
distinction to be made between particularized allegations and allegations that fail to support 
a showing of plausible entitlement to relief. 
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II.  THE DIVIDE OVER THE PLEADING STANDARD FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS 
Federal courts have not reached a consensus on which pleading standard, 
Rule 8(a) or 9(b), should apply to negligent misrepresentation claims.  The 
issue of pleading negligent misrepresentation splits not only circuit courts, 
but district courts as well.  There are various explanations, ranging from 
state law differences to policy preferences to courts failing to apply recent 
pleading standard precedent, for why the division and confusion among 
courts has become so widespread.  Because individual circuits have tended 
not to be uniform in their approach to addressing pleading standards in the 
context of negligent misrepresentation claims, it is not fair to call the 
conflict at issue a true “circuit split.”  Further, since no single factor alone is 
responsible for the divergent approaches, it is difficult to identify the true 
root of the conflict. 
Thus, this Part of the Note explains how the conflict plays out in federal 
courts by attempting to excavate the most important areas of contention 
among the courts, and how this contributes to the divergent pleading 
standard rationales.  Since there is no clearly identifiable circuit split, 
per se, but more accurately just confusion among courts, it will be more 
productive to examine the engines of the conflict thematically as opposed to 
geographically. 
First, this Part will look at conflicting, pre-Twombly policy approaches to 
interpreting Federal Rules 8 and 9 in the context of negligent 
misrepresentation claims.  It is vital to look at pre-Twombly approaches in 
depth because they still persist to a lesser, but significant, degree today.182  
Some courts, before and after Twombly, have embraced a broader, 
expanded role for Rule 9(b) in pleadings and have chosen to apply that 
standard to claims of negligent misrepresentation.183  On the other hand, 
some pre-Twombly courts, relying on the lenient constructs of 
transsubstantive notice pleading and a policy of lowering the bar for 
specificity in pleadings, had found Rule 8(a) to be the proper pleading 
standard for negligent misrepresentation.184 
The Part also examines how Twombly and Iqbal have impacted these 
policy approaches, with some courts using the framework of the new 
plausibility standard under Rule 8 to evaluate negligent misrepresentation 
claims.185 
Next, this Part evaluates how state law differences in negligent 
misrepresentation law affect the pleading standards courts apply when 
sitting in diversity.  Some states view negligent misrepresentation as 
tantamount to fraud or mistake, leading courts to apply the Rule 9(b) 
standard.186  Other states treat negligent misrepresentation more as a claim 
 
 182. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 183. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 184. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 185. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 186. See infra Part II.B. 
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of pure negligence than as a claim sounding in fraud or mistake, prompting 
federal courts applying the laws of those states to apply the Rule 8(a) 
pleading standard.187 
The final factor influencing the debate is an obvious one that flows from 
state law differences:  the ability of litigants to differentiate between claims 
of negligent misrepresentation and claims of fraud in their pleadings, so as 
to determine whether the former claims can stand on their own or are 
merely redundant claims of fraud, which require a Rule 9(b) pleading 
standard.188 
A.  Differing Policy Approaches to Pleading Negligent 
Misrepresentation Before Twombly 
Differing policy considerations and emphases led courts to different 
conclusions regarding the proper pleading standard for negligent 
misrepresentation claims before Twombly.  These considerations still affect 
some courts’ requirements for pleading negligent misrepresentation 
today.189 
Some courts, in applying Rule 9(b), have noted that negligent 
misrepresentation claims deserve more careful scrutiny at the pleading stage 
because they implicate serious reputational injury concerns.190  Other courts 
dismiss this policy rationale as unimportant or untrue and instead have 
applied Rule 8(a) as the pleading standard in the context of negligent 
misrepresentation.191 
Courts’ pre-Twombly preferences for how to evaluate the roles of Rules 8 
and 9, respectively, also factor into the debate.  Some courts envisioned 
Rule 9(b) taking on a larger role in pleadings generally.192  Others 
embraced a policy of transsubstantive notice pleading under Rule 8(a), 
lowering the bar for pleading negligent misrepresentation.193 
As noted above, while some of these pre-Twombly policy approaches 
continue to influence decisions in applying 9(b) or 8(a) to negligent 
misrepresentation claims today, some courts have started to adjust their 
approaches to deciding which pleading standard to apply, forgoing a Rule 
9(b) analysis and using the “plausibility” requirements of Rule 8(a) as a 
guide.194 
1.  A Pre-Twombly Policy Favoring Rule 9(b) 
Before Twombly, two major policy considerations regarding negligent 
misrepresentation influenced courts to apply the heightened Rule 9(b) 
 
 187. See infra Part II.B. 
 188. See infra Part II.B. 
 189. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 190. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 191. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 192. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 193. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 194. See infra Part II.A.3. 
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standard to common law negligent misrepresentation claims.  First, as the 
Fifth Circuit posited in Williams v. WMX Technologies, Inc.,195 Rule 9(b) 
generally deserved a larger role in pleading.196  This was especially true 
because, as the Southern District of New York reinforced in Simon v. 
Castello,197 negligent misrepresentation claims can seriously harm a 
defendant’s reputation and thus deserve more initial scrutiny under the Rule 
9(b) standard.198  Second, some courts treated negligent misrepresentation 
claims under the umbrella of “mistake,” as enumerated in Rule 9(b).199 
In Williams, the Fifth Circuit addressed the idea that Rule 9(b) should 
take on a larger role in pleading generally.200  In the case, the plaintiffs, 
former owners of a small sanitation company, sued WMX, a national 
garbage hauling service.201  The plaintiffs sold their company for WMX 
stock, claiming that they relied on misrepresentations by WMX that the 
United States was running out of space to dispose of trash.202  Accordingly, 
the plaintiffs brought claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation, inter 
alia, against WMX.203 
In an opinion dismissing the claims for failing to meet the specificity 
requirements of Rule 9(b), the Fifth Circuit declared that Rule 9(b) 
“demands a larger role for pleading in the pre-trial defining of such 
claims.”204  The court further stressed that the increased costs of pre-trial 
discovery militate in favor of applying Rule 9(b) more rigorously.205  
Although the Williams court did recognize that courts should give plaintiffs 
“a fair opportunity to plead,”206 consistent with Rule 8(e)’s command that 
“pleadings must be construed so as to do justice,”207 it still held that the 
plaintiffs’ claims lacked the requisite specificity under 9(b) to withstand a 
motion to dismiss, despite the relative length of their complaint.208  Critical 
to the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Williams was the nature of the fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation claims and how close they were to “non-
actionable expression[s] of opinion,” requiring that Rule 9(b) “take[] on 
especial force.”209 
 
 195. 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 196. See id. at 178. 
 197. 172 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 198. Id. at 105. 
 199. See, e.g., Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 199 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 
 200. See Williams, 112 F.3d at 178. 
 201. Id. at 176–77. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 177. 
 204. Id. at 178. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e). 
 208. Williams, 112 F.3d at 178 (“A complaint can be long-winded, even prolix, without 
pleading with particularity.  Indeed, such a garrulous style is not an uncommon mask for an 
absence of detail.  The amended complaint here, although long, states little with 
particularity.”). 
 209. Id. 
2013] 9(B) OR NOT 9(B)? 1471 
The impact that allegations of negligent misrepresentation can have on 
one’s reputation led the Southern District of New York in Simon v. 
Castello210 to require the Rule 9(b) pleading standard.211  In Simon, the 
court recognized that some of the common policy considerations militating 
in favor of applying Rule 9(b) to traditional fraud claims apply to negligent 
misrepresentation claims as well.212 
Some courts adopt Rule 9(b) because of the close similarity between 
mistake and negligent misrepresentation.213  For instance, while there is no 
controlling precedent in the Fourth Circuit,214 courts have pointed to several 
factors favoring Rule 9(b).  Most notably, because Rule 9(b) includes 
mistake, the rule is not confined to willful misrepresentations and could 
encompass negligently made ones.215 
In Breeden v. Richmond Community College,216 the Middle District of 
North Carolina (which sits in the Fourth Circuit) reasoned that a negligent 
misrepresentation claim, “[l]ike a claim for fraud or mistake, . . . is based 
upon some confusion or delusion of a party such as by some 
misrepresentation, omission, misapprehension or misunderstanding.”217  In 
its analysis, the court examined the history of Rule 9(b), explaining that 
claims of “mistake” for reasons other than fraud and deceit have been 
disfavored at common law.218 
2.  A Pre-Twombly Policy Approach Applying Rule 8(a)(2) 
While some courts took an expansive view of Rule 9(b) with regard to 
negligent misrepresentation claims, other courts insist that 9(b) ought to be 
treated as an exception to the general rule of pleading—which is governed 
by Rule 8(a)(2)—and, in the case of negligent misrepresentation, that this 
exception ought not to apply.219  These diverging approaches appear even 
 
 210. 172 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 211. See id. at 105. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 199 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 
 214. See Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 436, 
447 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Breeden, 171 F.R.D. at 199. 
 215. Breeden, 171 F.R.D. at 199 (“Rather, the rule was designed to govern claims 
premised upon a party’s misrepresentation, misapprehension, or misunderstanding; in short, 
arising out of either mutual or unilateral confusion, whether intentionally or carelessly 
generated.”). 
 216. 171 F.R.D. at 189. 
 217. Id. at 202. 
 218. Id. at 201.  Accordingly, the court held that Rule 9(b) should apply to negligent 
misrepresentation claims. Id. at 202 (“In conclusion, from the rule’s historical foundations, 
its text, and the nature of fraud and mistake actions, this Court finds that Rule 9(b) applies to 
actions wherein the major component involves significant delusion or confusion of a party, 
whether intentional or not.”). 
 219. See, e.g., Balt. Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App’x 914, 922 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2005); Am. Realty Trust, Inc. 
v. Hamilton Lane Advisors, Inc., 115 F. App’x 662, 668–69 (5th Cir. 2004); HSA 
Residential Mortg. Servs. of Tex. v. Casuccio, 350 F. Supp. 2d 352, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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within the same circuit, illuminating the conflict over the negligent 
misrepresentation pleading standard.220 
In American Realty Trust, Inc. v. Hamilton Lane Advisors, Inc.,221 a case 
arising in the Fifth Circuit, a real estate company sued financial advisors for 
negligently misrepresenting their ability to assist the company with a 
refinancing project.222  The plaintiffs brought separate claims for fraud as 
well, alleging that the defendants had made these misrepresentations to 
induce them to enter into a separate consulting contract.223 
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit was careful to distinguish between the 
fraud claim and the negligent misrepresentation claim, taking a 
substantially different view of the purpose of Rule 9(b) than it did in 
Williams.224  The court specifically emphasized that Rule 9(b) is an 
exception to the general pleading standard that must be applied 
cautiously.225 
Significantly, the court advanced this policy view of applying Rule 9(b) 
sparingly in conjunction with espousing what it described as “liberal”226 
Rule 8 pleading requirements.  This policy approach to Rule 9(b), when 
combined with a liberal attitude about pleading more in line with 
Swierkiewicz than with the courts that defied notice pleading, leads to a 
different result in evaluating how negligent misrepresentation claims are 
pleaded. 
The American Realty complaint did include separate counts for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation, but the latter count contained little substance to 
set it apart from the fraud claim.227  Still, the court found it to be 
sufficiently detailed to survive under Rule 8(a)(2), while dismissing the 
fraud counts under Rule 9(b).228 
Taking such an approach is significant when the plaintiff fails or is 
unable to make allegations of negligent misrepresentation with the level of 
specificity required under Rule 9(b).229  In General Electric Capital Corp. 
v. Posey,230 yet another Fifth Circuit case, a lender sued former directors 
and officers of a medical services company, claiming that negligent 
misrepresentations on financial statements induced the lender to make a bad 
 
 220. See, e.g., Am. Realty, 115 F. App’x at 662; Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 415 F.3d at 
391. 
 221. 115 F. App’x at 662. 
 222. Id. at 663–64. 
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 224. See id. at 668. 
 225. See id. (“Rule 9(b) is an exception to the liberal federal court pleading requirements 
embodied in Rule 8(a).  Rule 9(b)’s stringent pleading requirements should not be extended 
to causes of actions not enumerated therein.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Amended Complaint at 9–10, Am. Realty, 115 F. App’x at 662 (No. 3:02-CV-
0641-G). 
 228. Am. Realty, 115 F. App’x at 668. 
 229. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pleaded negligent misrepresentation despite the fact 
that “the allegations are devoid of much factual particularity”). 
 230. Id. 
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loan to the company.231  At oral argument, one defendant insisted—and the 
court did not disagree232—that the plaintiff never stated “any kind of detail 
for us to be able to discern what facts are being alleged” regarding the 
misrepresentations of the financial statements.233  Still, the court concluded 
that “[u]nder the lenient standard of notice pleading, such a ‘short and plain 
statement of the claim’ is sufficient” and allowed the negligent 
misrepresentation claim to proceed.234 
The Fifth Circuit is not the only court to manifest conflicting pre-
Twombly precedents regarding the proper negligent misrepresentation 
pleading standard; both the Fourth Circuit and the Eastern District of New 
York have, in certain cases, aligned with the approach in American Realty 
and General Electric.235 
In Baltimore County v. Cigna Healthcare,236 the Fourth Circuit—which 
itself is divided on the proper pleading standard for negligent 
misrepresentation claims—distinguished fraud from negligent 
misrepresentation on policy grounds, positing that the latter did not 
implicate reputational injury concerns, thereby justifying the application of 
Rule 8.237  The court explained, “To require that non-fraud allegations be 
stated with particularity merely because they appear in a complaint 
alongside fraud averments, however, serves no similar reputation-
preserving function, and would impose a burden on plaintiffs not 
contemplated by the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).”238 
This view directly clashes with the assertion in Simon v. Castello that 
negligent misrepresentation claims bear heavily on one’s reputation.239  A 
dissenting opinion in Cigna Healthcare highlighted this conflict, noting that 
“negligent misrepresentation claims bear on the morality of defendant’s 
conduct and his reputation going forward.”240 
 
 231. Id. at 393–94. 
 232. Id. at 397 (noting that the complaint contained “minimal factual particularity”). 
 233. Id. 
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was decided before Twombly and Iqbal.  While the “short and plain statement” language 
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General Electric would survive a motion to dismiss under a heightened Rule 8 standard 
remains uncertain.  For a thorough discussion on the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on notice 
pleading, see supra Part I.D. 
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 240. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App’x at 925 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see also William 
D. Bolling III, Comment, Denver Health & Hospital Authority v. Beverage Distributors Co.:  
An Illustration of Converging Pleading Doctrines, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 369, 390 (2012) 
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In fact, six years before Simon v. Castello was decided, the Eastern 
District of New York (which sits in the Second Circuit) in HSA Residential 
Mortgage Services of Texas v. Casuccio,241 reflected the tone of General 
Electric and embraced a liberal, notice-pleading approach to negligent 
misrepresentation claims.242  In that case, the court cited Swierkiewicz243 
and Conley244 to hold that the plaintiff “need only give fair notice of the 
negligent misrepresentation claim and the grounds upon which it rests.”245 
3.  A Post-Twombly Policy Adjustment 
In light of the Twombly decision, courts across several circuits have 
started to reevaluate their previous policy rationales regarding the pleading 
standard for negligent misrepresentation claims, ultimately settling on Rule 
8(a)(2) and forgoing a Rule 9(b) analysis because of the higher bar now 
imposed by the generalized standard.246 
This trend is particularly notable within the Fifth Circuit, which had 
previously been fractured over the proper pleading standard for negligent 
misrepresentation claims.247  In Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,248 the 
Northern District of Texas was presented with negligent misrepresentation 
and breach of contract claims stemming from the defendant bank’s alleged 
misrepresentation of the language it used to characterize a sale of property 
to the plaintiffs in the defendant’s report to a credit bureau.249 
In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court applied the Rule 
8(a)(2) plausibility standard under Twombly and reasoned that the plaintiffs 
only recited the elements of the cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation in their complaint and did not allege enough facts, 
showing that the defendant “failed to exercise reasonable care in 
communicating the information in the agreement [regarding the reporting of 
the property sale].”250 
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application of Rule 8(a) to negligent misrepresentation claims). 
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DAD, 2012 WL 5289325, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012); Massey v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
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 247. See supra Part II.A.1–2. 
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 249. Id. at *1.  This misrepresentation ultimately hindered the plaintiffs’ ability to 
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 250. Id. at *2. 
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In particular, the court cited both Twombly and Iqbal to set forth the 
misrepresentation pleading standard and support its conclusion that 
negligent misrepresentation should be pleaded in accordance with the post-
Twombly plausibility standard under Rule 8(a)(2):  “Although a complaint 
need not contain detailed factual allegations, the ‘showing’ contemplated by 
Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to do more than simply allege legal conclusions 
or recite the elements of a cause of action.”251 
The approach taken by the court in Wells Fargo could represent an 
emerging trend among Texas district courts to treat negligent 
misrepresentation claims under the general Rule 8 pleading standard, but to 
require a greater level of specificity than has traditionally been required 
under Rule 8 in light of Twombly and Iqbal.252 
This development is not unique to district courts within the Fifth Circuit.  
The District of New Mexico first recognized this shift just a year after 
Twombly was decided, citing the elevated pleading standard as additional 
support for applying Rule 8 instead of Rule 9(b) to claims of negligent 
misrepresentation.253 
[T]he Supreme Court has recently made the standards for dismissal under 
rule 12(b)(6) more rigorous.  Notice pleading under [Twombly] has real 
teeth.  There is no sound reason to give corporate defendants accused of 
negligent misrepresentation more protection that [sic] doctors accused of 
malpractice or automobile operators of negligence.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly serves the purposes of pleading negligent misrepresentation as 
well as would rule 9(b).  Indeed, the Twombly rule is better, because there 
is nothing served by creating a new exception to Twombly’s general rule 
for a negligence tort unless there is some compelling reason to do so.254 
More recently, a court in the District of New Jersey confronted the 
negligent misrepresentation pleading standard in light of both Twombly and 
Iqbal when it granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for 
negligent misrepresentation under New York law stemming from the 
development, labeling, and marketing of the drug Plavix.255  In that case, 
Gonzalez v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, the defendants sought dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim because it allegedly failed to 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b).256  The plaintiff countered that Rule 8 
was the proper standard for pleading negligent misrepresentation claims.257 
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The court’s opinion first addressed the question by pointing out that the 
“inapplicability of Rule 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation claims . . . is not 
as settled as Plaintiff suggest[ed].”258  However, the court decided to cut the 
plaintiff off not with Rule 9(b), but with Rule 8.259  The court noted that the 
complaint lacked any allegations regarding the specifics of the 
misrepresentations that the plaintiff relied on and did not address which 
misrepresentations he relied on in choosing to take Plavix.260 
Recently, the Eastern District of California took a similar approach, 
where the court dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim of negligent 
misrepresentation because, “[r]egardless of whether negligent 
misrepresentation claims are governed by the pleading standards of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 or the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), 
in light of Iqbal and Twombly, the court finds defendant’s allegations 
insufficient to state claims for either negligent or intentional 
misrepresentation.”261  Thus, the court effectively refused to resolve 
directly whether the pleading standard should be governed by Rule 8(a)(2) 
or 9(b), because if a plaintiff cannot satisfy the former, he most certainly 
cannot satisfy the latter. 
4.  Failing To Apply New Precedent to the Pleading Standard Analysis 
Even in the face of the emerging trend in various districts and circuits to 
resolve the negligent misrepresentation pleading standard quandary by 
looking to the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Twombly and Iqbal, 
many courts have continued to apply pre-Twombly policy rationales in 
choosing Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 9(b).262 
In that sense, disarray persists over what the proper pleading standard 
should be, even within the same district.  Within the Fifth Circuit, a court in 
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Supp. 2d 509, 518–19 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (using pre-Twombly case law as a rationale to apply 
Rule 9(b) to a negligent misrepresentation claim, while applying Twombly’s Rule 8(a)(2) 
standard to other common law claims). 
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the Southern District of Texas decided to apply Rule 9(b) in Kiper v. BAC 
Home Loans Servicing, LP.263  In Kiper, plaintiff sued a lender and 
mortgage servicer for, inter alia, misrepresenting the status of plaintiff’s 
request for a loan modification.264  In selecting Rule 9(b) as the proper 
pleading standard for the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court cited 
Williams v. WMX Technlologies, Inc.265—the 1997 Fifth Circuit opinion 
espousing a broader role for Rule 9(b) in pleadings266—to support its 
analysis.267 
Districts in other circuits have conducted similar analyses in continuing 
to apply Rule 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation claims in a post-Twombly 
world, taking into account the policy factors, such as reputational 
consequences, that courts urged in pre-Twombly case law.  The District of 
Nevada (which sits in the Ninth Circuit) took this approach in Pacchiega v. 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,268 recently applying Rule 9(b) to 
negligent misrepresentation claims in a loan misrepresentation context 
similar to Kiper.269  In choosing to apply Rule 9(b) to the negligent 
misrepresentation claim, the court acknowledged the importance of 
Twombly and the Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility standard, which the court 
discussed extensively in emphasizing the Twombly plausibility standard.270  
Even so, the court insisted on holding the negligent misrepresentation claim 
to the Rule 9(b) standard while noting that one of the main purposes of that 
rule is to protect against unfair reputational injury.271 
In Apace Communications, Ltd. v. Burke,272 the Western District of New 
York further evidenced a refusal to align the standard for pleading negligent 
misrepresentation with the Twombly decision, citing a Second Circuit case 
decided before Twombly to support the application of Rule 9(b).273  Like 
the Northern District of Texas in Kiper, the Western District of New York 
subjected other common law claims, including constructive fraud, “to the 
‘plausibility’ requirement of Rule 8 as enunciated in Twombly.”274 
On the other hand, some courts preferring a Rule 8(a)(2) pleading 
standard for negligent misrepresentation claims appear to be giving these 
claims less scrutiny than they deserve in light of Twombly’s plausibility 
requirement.  In 2009, more than two full years after Twombly, the District 
of Maryland (which sits in the Fourth Circuit) cited Baltimore County v. 
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Cigna Healthcare275 in support of applying a “liberal” standard of “‘notice 
pleading’ under Rule 8(a)(2)” to a negligent misrepresentation claim.276  
And, in contrast to the Western District of New York’s approach in Apace 
Communications, a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of New York 
recently cited HSA Residential—a 2003 Eastern District of New York 
decision relying heavily on Conley and Swierkiewicz277—in considering the 
appropriate pleading standard for a negligent misrepresentation claim in his 
report and recommendation.278 
B.  The Impact of Differing State Legal Interpretations of Negligent 
Misrepresentation on the Federal Pleading Standard 
Differing state law interpretations and formulations of negligent 
misrepresentation also influence the corresponding federal pleading 
standard for cases heard in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.  This 
state law impact occurs because some states, such as Florida and Kentucky, 
consider negligent misrepresentation to be tantamount, or nearly 
tantamount, to actual fraud—which in federal court must be pleaded with 
particularity.279  Other states, such as Illinois and New Mexico, treat 
negligent misrepresentation as closer to a claim of pure negligence, which 
would be governed by the Rule 8(a)(2) standard.280 
For instance, the Southern District of Florida has gravitated towards Rule 
9(b) for pleading negligent misrepresentation because the state law 
elements of the claim sound in fraud.281  Under Florida law, the elements of 
negligent misrepresentation make it “tantamount to actionable fraud.”282 
The Florida Supreme Court noted that, because it is an action “for deceit, 
[it] is necessarily founded in fraud, and, in order to make out a case of 
fraud, as distinguished from inadvertence, mistake, negligence, accident, 
and the like, it is necessary to allege and prove the scienter,—the 
knowledge of defendant that his representations were false.”283 
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The Sixth Circuit took a similar approach when examining Kentucky 
law.284  In a recent case, the court highlighted the duplicitous nature of one 
element of a properly pleaded negligent misrepresentation claim under 
Kentucky law, which requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant 
provided false information for the guidance of others in a transaction.285  As 
a result, the court concluded that Kentucky’s negligent misrepresentation 
law necessarily implicated various policy issues normally associated with 
applying Rule 9(b), namely threat of reputational injury.286 
Conversely, where a state’s laws recognize a more concrete dividing line 
between negligent misrepresentation and fraud, federal courts applying that 
state’s laws are more likely to allow Rule 8 to govern a negligent 
misrepresentation claim.287  In Tricontinental Industries v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers,288 the Seventh Circuit used Illinois law to inform 
its choice about the proper pleading standard for a claim by the plaintiff that 
the defendant accounting firm negligently misrepresented the financial 
worth of a client whose stock the plaintiff was considering purchasing.289  
The court refused to apply Rule 9(b) to the claim, treating it more like 
negligence than actual fraud, because Illinois law imposes a duty on 
accounting firms, such as the defendant, to refrain from negligently or 
carelessly making false statements on which third parties not in privity with 
the defendant may foreseeably rely.290 
Along the same lines, the District of New Mexico, in City of Raton v. 
Arkansas River Power Authority,291 recently addressed the pleading 
standard for negligent misrepresentation in light of New Mexico law, under 
which there has been a longstanding and important distinction in state 
courts between negligent misrepresentation and fraud- and deceit-style 
claims.292  Specifically, the highest court in New Mexico has stated, 
“Negligent misrepresentation is not, of course, a ‘lesser included’ cause of 
action within a claim for deceit or fraud.”293  Thus, in contrast to the Florida 
Supreme Court’s proclamation that negligent misrepresentation is 
tantamount to fraud,294 the differing treatment of negligent 
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misrepresentation in New Mexico has led the District of New Mexico to 
apply Rule 8(a)(2) to negligent misrepresentation claims, instead of the 
heightened Rule 9(b) standard imposed for claims sounding in fraud.295 
III.  THE NEED TO ABANDON PRE-TWOMBLY PRECEDENTS 
Thus, on a global level, there is an array of complex issues affecting the 
way that federal courts evaluate and choose pleading standards for claims of 
negligent misrepresentation, contributing to the courts’ general lack of 
consistency on the subject. 
However, there is one common theme linking everything together and 
keeping the confusion alive:  a high level of casualness among federal 
courts in regard to federal pleading standards, a problem which is 
compounded by inconsistencies in state law.  As such, the pleading standard 
for negligent misrepresentation remains in a state of chaotic disarray. 
To be sure, Twombly and Iqbal are relatively new precedents, and it will 
take time for federal courts to recognize how they apply to meaningfully 
distinguish or merge Rules 8(a)(2) and 9(b).296  But, at least for the time 
being, one thing is clear:  while Twombly and Iqbal have influenced some 
courts’ evaluation of negligent misrepresentation pleading standards,297 
other courts persist in applying pre-Twombly precedent,298 rendering the 
Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements on pleading standards 
ineffectual in the negligent misrepresentation context. 
As a result, pre-Twombly precedent takes on even greater importance in 
the discussion about negligent misrepresentation pleading standards.  And 
needless to say, that precedent is not well settled.299 
But perhaps the most important problem causing differing and competing 
approaches to negligent misrepresentation pleading standards is not 
necessarily what the conflicts within the precedents are, but rather how the 
courts have chosen to treat precedent in the first place.  In order to better 
track the development and pervasiveness of this theme, it is important to 
start from Conley, not from Twombly. 
One of Clark’s main goals in crafting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was to eliminate obstacles so that litigants could have their day 
in court.300  He sought to break down the rigid formalism that characterized 
the previous system of rules.301 
In some respects, Conley was the realization of that vision, though 
perhaps an extreme one.  The “no set of facts” standard created a precedent 
that sought to eliminate barriers to entry for litigants pursuing claims in 
federal court.302  In the process, lower courts, though technically bound by 
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the Supreme Court’s precedent, found that the standard was not appropriate 
for certain types of claims, and so they routinely ignored the Conley 
command, instead raising the Rule 8(a)(2) bar on a seemingly ad hoc 
basis.303 
The Supreme Court tried to address the lower courts’ casual disregard for 
the Conley ruling in Leatherman, which proved only to be a failed attempt 
at upholding the Conley version of notice pleading.304  Indeed, lower courts 
continued to find ways around Leatherman, reflecting a special concern that 
the ease with which a litigant could plead a claim under Conley threatened 
to put a dent in the reputations—and the pocketbooks—of defendants who 
potentially were not at any legal fault.305 
The Supreme Court made one last attempt in Swierkiewicz to rein in the 
lower courts and restore the Conley notice pleading standard.306  But those 
efforts failed, as was plainly apparent by the Court’s revisiting and 
“retiring” of Conley’s rendition of notice pleading four years later in 
Twombly.307 
This narrative of the lower courts’ persistently casual treatment of 
Supreme Court pleading standard precedent helps to inform the 
development and muddled state of the law as it relates to evaluating a 
proper pleading standard for negligent misrepresentation. 
Before Twombly, the level of specificity required in a complaint under 
Rule 8(a)(2) was relatively low, making it easy for plaintiffs to bring claims 
of negligent misrepresentation under that pleading standard.308  Even courts 
that embraced the Rule 8(a)(2) standard referred to it as “liberal.”309 
As such, it is no surprise that, without clear direction from the Supreme 
Court—and with so many lower courts choosing not to follow its pleading 
standard decisions anyway—some lower courts adopted a preference for 
Rule 9(b).310  Purely as a matter of policy, some courts gravitated towards 
Rule 9(b) for pleading negligent misrepresentation claims because Rule 
8(a)(2) had no bite, making it too easy for plaintiffs to survive Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.311  And lower courts’ concerns over applying a 
relatively weak pleading standard to negligent misrepresentation claims 
were magnified because of the potential reputational implications these 
claims can have on defendants.312  Finally, negligent misrepresentation on 
its own—state law differences and interpretations aside—is an interesting 
claim because it can conceivably be thought of as a type of “mistake” in the 
Rule 9(b) sense, thereby requiring the Rule 9(b) standard to govern.313 
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Thus, to the extent that policy affects courts’ pleading standard calculus, 
negligent misrepresentation claims may be conducive to a heightened 
pleading standard. 
The other important aspect of negligent misrepresentation, which is 
heavily dictated by state law differences, is that the claim itself is not 
always so different from a straightforward claim of fraud.314  The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure have specifically enumerated fraud as a claim to 
be pleaded under the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard.315  States that 
treat negligent misrepresentation as being tantamount to fraud then give 
federal courts in those states good reason to apply the fraud pleading 
standard to negligent misrepresentation claims.316 
On the other hand, some states take the view that negligent 
misrepresentation is closer to a claim of pure negligence.317  In that context, 
it would make sense for a federal court to apply the general pleading 
standard for negligence, which is unquestionably Rule 8(a)(2).318 
Thus, given the variations in states’ formulations and interpretations of 
negligent misrepresentation law, coupled with conflicting categorizations of 
the claim at the federal level, it is naturally difficult for courts to agree on a 
uniform standard for negligent misrepresentation claims.319 
Where the substantive state law on negligent misrepresentation is clear, 
the federal courts should be responsible for carrying it out, and applying an 
appropriate pleading standard accordingly.  Therefore, if a state law very 
clearly treats negligent misrepresentation as being tantamount to fraud, then 
the federal court should have a responsibility to apply Rule 9(b) to a 
negligent misrepresentation claim.  And, if a state obviously favors treating 
negligent misrepresentation as closer to negligence, then Rule 8(a)(2) ought 
to apply. 
The problem is that state law is not always clear, and what’s more, 
federal courts do not always apply it properly or treat it with an appropriate 
level of care.  In fact, in the context of negligent misrepresentation, a 
Montana district court ignored lines of precedent and conflicting 
interpretations of the state’s negligent misrepresentation law to bring the 
tort closer to fraud.320  Further, as a policy matter, it is potentially 
problematic for federal judges within the same district sitting in diversity to 
apply different pleading standards to the same claim because of nebulous 
state law variations. 
Thus, while consulting and applying state law should theoretically be the 
first step of federal courts in trying to decide which pleading standard 
should govern a claim of negligent misrepresentation, in practice it is not 
 
 314. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 280–87 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 291–96 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra notes 291–96 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
2013] 9(B) OR NOT 9(B)? 1483 
clear that this strategy would work.321  And further, given how complex and 
conflicted the law on negligent misrepresentation may be within a given 
state, it is not always true that state law will draw a clear distinction about 
whether negligent misrepresentation is closer to fraud or negligence.322  So, 
in such a situation, what is a federal court to do? 
Since Twombly, federal courts’ answer to that question has turned, rather 
predictably, on the courts’ willingness, or lack thereof, to adhere to 
pleading standard precedent.323  And while the Twombly and Iqbal 
precedents are still young, there are preliminary indications that lower 
courts are not following them in the negligent misrepresentation context.324 
In light of Twombly, the need to have an expanded role for Rule 9(b), as 
the Fifth Circuit urged in Williams, should no longer be too significant.325  
Nonetheless, even after Twombly, the Northern District of Texas recently 
cited the Williams opinion in applying Rule 9(b) to a claim of negligent 
misrepresentation. 
That courts are lagging behind in applying the proper precedent for 
negligent misrepresentation claims is more alarming and dangerous than the 
end result of selecting one standard over the other.  The District of 
Maryland, in selecting Rule 8(a)(2) as the standard to govern negligent 
misrepresentation, cited case law discussing the liberal standard of notice 
pleading under Rule 8(a)(2), as though the decision were being rendered in 
the Conley era.326 
This is the crux of the conflict and major reason for why federal courts 
ought to be concerned. 
One of the great difficulties, in light of the plausibility standard 
announced in Twombly, in deciding whether to apply Rule 8 or 9(b) to 
negligent misrepresentation claims, is that both standards have started to 
converge.327  However, to the extent that the standards remain separate 
from each other, with Rule 9(b) acting as a clearly heightened standard over 
Rule 8(a)(2), Rule 8(a)(2) cannot easily become a panacea for the negligent 
misrepresentation pleading problem given state law differences in the 
treatment of negligent misrepresentation claims.328  Twombly has decidedly 
not altered the original motivation for a heightened pleading standard for 
fraud,329 so district courts in states that treat negligent misrepresentation as 
tantamount to fraud would likely want to continue applying Rule 9(b) to 
negligent misrepresentation claims, and rightfully so. 
Thus, at bottom, the revised pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2) should 
not be the first resort for federal courts.  First, it is important for courts to 
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attempt to determine the thrust of state law and apply the appropriate 
pleading standard accordingly.  However, given the uncertainty surrounding 
state law and the conflicting line of precedents both pre- and post-Twombly, 
federal courts must rely on the revised general pleading standard under Rule 
8(a)(2) as the default option when state law does not provide clear 
guidance.330 
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions militate against the old policy 
justifications for elevating pleading standards for claims not clearly 
sounding in fraud or mistake.  Where state law does not dictate otherwise, 
negligent misrepresentation does not deserve an elevated pleading standard:  
the Supreme Court has already addressed concerns about possible threats to 
a defendant’s reputation or high litigation expenses.331 
In addition, courts treating negligent misrepresentation as a non-fraud-
based, traditional common law claim have never provided rationale for why 
pure claims of negligent misrepresentation ought to be viewed and pleaded 
differently and more liberally than general common law claims.  These 
courts would not argue that negligent misrepresentation should be some sort 
of exception, like fraud, to transsubstantive norms.332  As such, there is no 
reason why negligent misrepresentation claims should not be subjected to a 
less stringent pleading standard than any other typical common law claim.  
Conley-style notice pleading for negligent misrepresentation is outdated and 
should never be articulated as a rationale for applying Rule 8(a)(2) to 
govern such claims.333 
On the other hand, raising the bar uniformly to a Rule 9(b) standard 
requiring particularity would extinguish negligent misrepresentation claims 
as we know them, making them essentially tantamount to traditional fraud 
claims.  This policy is not a sound one, because there are subtle yet 
important differences between negligent misrepresentation and fraud.334  
Rule 9(b) is very much a special breed of pleading requirement, and it needs 
to be cabined as such. 
As it stands now, the PSLRA has influenced courts even in their 
treatment of common law claims, notably fraud-based ones.335  Raising the 
negligent misrepresentation standard uniformly to that set forth in Rule 9(b) 
threatens to elevate the pleading standard beyond what should be 
appropriate for a common law claim not purely rooted in fraud. 
Therefore, the revised standard under Rule 8(a)(2) provides a good 
compromise solution for federal courts when there is uncertainty over the 
treatment of state law negligent misrepresentation claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
Lower federal courts have traditionally taken a casual approach to the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncements on pleading standards.  And they have 
made no exception for claims of negligent misrepresentation.  As such, the 
pleading standard for negligent misrepresentation in federal courts remains 
as murky as ever.  In addition, state law variations in negligent 
misrepresentation further prevent federal courts from adopting a universal 
standard, or even from taking a consistent approach to evaluating which 
standard to apply.  Thus, to eliminate the confusion, to streamline pleading, 
and to follow current precedent, federal courts must first do a better job of 
attempting to discern state law on negligent misrepresentation.  When the 
law is unclear, the courts should not hesitate to apply Rule 8(a)(2) for 
claims of negligent misrepresentation in light of Twombly and Iqbal, as the 
revised pleading standard more comfortably fits these unique common law 
claims. 
 
